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Abstract
This article explores the possibility of a notion of left-wing populism that is conceptually opposed
to the identitarian logic of embodiment that characterises right-populist interpellations of ‘the
people’. In the first part, I will demonstrate, that in Laclau’s constructivist approach, any populist
embodiment of the people actually has a partial, subaltern and performative origin. On this basis, it
becomes possible to distinguish between a radical-democratic version of the people that is self-
reflexively aware of this origin and a regressive and reified one that ideologically betrays and
negates its own subaltern tradition of democratic struggle by proclaiming to embody a positive,
pre-established substance of ‘rooted’, ‘well-born’ community. In the second part of the article,
I will focus on this self-negation as a starting point for an immanent critique of right-wing populism.
Such an immanent critique is promising, because it could overcome the shortcomings of deci-
sionism and moralism that limit the contemporary critique of right-wing populism. However, it
remains still an open question how to defend and define a negativist truth of political community
and subjectivation that is necessary for developing such a left-Hegelian critique of regressive and
reified notions of ‘the people’.
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Western democracies have been pushed into crisis by right-populist attacks on the
universalism of human rights, the pluralism of deliberation, the constitutional system
of representation and so on. While this diagnosis is widely beyond doubt, how to counter
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and reverse this tendency remains disputed. Liberal answers attempt to defend the Uni-
versalist normativity of modern democracy by trying to erect a cordon sanitaire that
keeps racist and authoritarian voices away from politics, thus preserving the purity of the
principles of the constitution. It is proclaimed that certain achievements of moral prog-
ress need to be immunised against shifting political conjunctures. Instead of being the
content of lively democratic discussion, those norms and values are considered as defin-
ing the very core of democracy tout court that must therefore be stabilised through the
installation of legal thresholds and restrictions (cf. Issacharoff 2017; Levitzky and
Ziblatt 2018). Albeit justified from a normative point of view, this liberal position has
two major shortcomings. First, by reducing the recent crisis of democracy to a challenge
that is provoked by radical outsiders, it is heavily underestimated how strongly the right-
populist notion of a people that is imagined in terms of origin and ethnical belonging is
naively taken for granted in large sectors of society. This ‘ethical’ assumption is even
reflected juridically through a conservative definition of the access to citizenship (this is
at least the case in countries where jus sanguinis is – more or less – the primary rule, like
in Germany). Thus, the liberal equation of democracy and human rights conceals that the
legitimating values of ‘our democracy’ are heavily contested, and that nationalist pre-
suppositions have been able to survive under the cosmopolitan surface of post-fascism.
Second, the liberal answer is not only naive and unpolitical but also risks to enforce
Universalist norms in an authoritarian manner that is openly in tension with the modern
promise of popular sovereignty. This is happening when human rights are conceived as
external limits of democratic will-formation that need to be imposed by law, constitu-
tional and international courts, moral and political education and so on. However, to
proceed this way tragically verifies the right-populist narration of elitist expertocracy
that deprives ‘ordinary’ people of their political and moral autonomy and that depicts
them as irrational and unethical masses that must be coerced and civilised.
Radical-democratic approaches try to avoid the shortcomings of the liberal answer by
acknowledging the fundamental contestedness of the basic principles of modern democ-
racy and by pursuing the universalism of human rights as a political project that operates
democratically from below (cf. Balibar 2004; Rancière 1999). Generally, in this tradi-
tion, Universalist frameworks of justice and participation don’t need to be externally
imposed to the exercise of popular sovereignty but stem internally from the latter, from
the emergence of democratic subjectivities that are originally constituted against pre-
vailing privileges (cf. Balibar 1994). It is also within this tradition of political theory that
conceptions of a left populism have been developed and defended. Chantal Mouffe has
argued prominently that the only feasible way of fighting against right populism and its
dangers is to free the notion of ‘the people’ from its nationalist distortion and exclusivist
definition and to recapture it in a left, open, pluralistic and inclusive way by shifting the
central axis of antagonism. Instead of identifying foreigners, strangers and other mino-
rities as the enemy of ‘the people’ that conversely defines the latter, the Schmittian
distinction is applied to the inner divisions of established communities. Neoliberal
capitalism, the corresponding forms of post-democratic politics, and the supporting
oligarchic strata are now focused as the hegemonic complex against which a new
collective will of ‘the people’ must be formed in order to defend the passion for democ-
racy and to avoid that this passion is perverted by an authoritarian image of collective
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autonomy (cf. Mouffe 2018, 2019, 6). From the standpoint of a consequently construc-
tivist theory of hegemony (cf. Laclau and Mouffe 1985), ‘the people’ is construed as a
contingent signifier that is neither bound to a certain sociological content – defined
ethnically, culturally, economically and so on – nor confined to a specific ethico-
political meaning. For sure, historically ‘the people’ was often conceptualised in a racist,
repressive and totalitarian manner with disastrous effects. But according to Mouffe,
Ernesto Laclau, Jacque Rancière and others, there is also a genuinely different discourse
of interpellating ‘the people’: the unruly, heterogeneous and bastardly people of the
French Revolution, the sans-culottes of 1789, the multitudinous and subaltern mass of
all those who raise their voices against colonial, economic and cultural elites, of all those
who aren’t well-born, who have no recognised property of belonging, except the mere
fact that they are part of an uncountable, unqualified ‘people’ (cf. Rancière 1999, 1–19).
Following Mouffe, the meaning of ‘the people’ varies according to the discursive ‘chains
of equivalence’ that are politically constructed (cf. Mouffe 2019, 62–64). All what’s
crucial for radical politics today is to invest this work of construction, to formulate a
vision of the people that is affectively able to reattach lost electorates to a left project of
emancipation.
In this article, I will discuss the left-populist answer to the crisis of liberal democracy.
The approach of a left populism has been questioned in many ways (cf. Arato and Cohen
2017; Fassin 2019), but especially two main problems are central for the debate:
1. First, it is not very clear how to distinguish left and right forms of populism
conceptually from each other. Of course, there is an intuitive common sense that
seems to be capable to identify what’s left and what’s right. But there is also a big
grey area in between those clearly opposed poles where socialist demands for
more economic justice obscurely merge with nationalist identities, xenophobic
hierarchies of status, repressive protectionism, and structural anti-Semitism.
There is a constant danger that left-populist movements smoothly amount to a
superficially red-painted rebirth of nationalism that replaces the pain of subaltern
struggles with the illusory proud of being an ‘ordinary German’ who is willing to
fight for his inherited privileges (cf. Fassin 2018, 81–83; Slobodian and Callison
2019). Are conceptions of populism inherently totalitarian, identity-based and
destructive, so that any attempt to construct emancipatory versions of populism is
a contradiction in terms that ideologically disguises its regressive way of func-
tioning, as liberal and left-Hegelian authors argue (cf. Arato 2013; Arato and
Cohen 2019)? I want to reject this view in the first part of my article by showing
that the negativistic, subaltern and constructivist character of leftist versions of
populism conceptually differentiates the latter from its right-wing counterpart.
The left-populist ‘people’ is decisively constituted as an entirely different polit-
ical subjectivity that is diametrically opposed to any ‘rooted’ right-wing people.
2. In the second half of the article, I will discuss another point which remains largely
undiscussed in Mouffe and Laclau’s work on populism: While there is a con-
ceptual difference between left and right versions, how they politically relate to
each other is still unexplored. Obviously they contradict each other both in terms
of their core values and their way of constituting a collective subjectivity. But
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how they politically confront each other has not yet been inquired more system-
atically. Mouffe tends to reduce this problem to a question of rhetoric that is
persuasive enough for rearticulating those demands that are now still clustered by
the political right (cf. Mouffe 2019, 75–78). However, this leads to the unsatisfy-
ing notion of two opposing projects of hegemony between which the involved
actors have to decide beyond any rational form of conviction. For sure, there are
many normative and political arguments against right-populist interpellations of
‘the people’, but those arguments risk remaining external to the immanent con-
struction of the latter, thus not affecting and rebutting its own world view. In
order to overcome this shortcoming, it is necessary to move from either moralism
or decisionism to immanent critique. This gets possible by linking both sides, by
demonstrating how left-populist notions of the people reveal a truth about polit-
ical subjectivity that is ideologically veiled and betrayed by right-populist mys-
tifications of identity. A glimpse of this thought is already present in Laclau’s
reflections on the varieties of populism (cf. Laclau 2005, 196f, 208). Here we can
find the following thesis: any racist, exclusivist or totalitarian closure of the
people amounts to a self-negation of its own historical formation, and, we can
possibly add, to a revocation of exactly the tradition and tendency of struggle that
has historically emancipated in the very first place those who claim to be the
people. I will elaborate and sharpen this promising notion of a self-negating
people but also want to scrutinise what’s unclear about it: While the rational
approach of immanent critique would be a very attractive option for dealing with
right populism, it is not easy to combine Laclau’s radical-democratic assumption
that ‘the political’ lacks any definitive normative or objective foundation with
(cf. Laclau 2000; Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 114–27, 134–48; Mouffe 2013, xif)
the Hegelian idea of a political subject that ideologically misconceives, negates
and betrays its own truth. It is possible to overcome this theoretical incompat-
ibility? Can a critical criterion of rationality be inscribed into a radical-
democratic framework? How has the latter to be modified in order to allow for
this rationalisation?
1. Another people?
Radical-democratic theorising of populism has become an object of general critique,
both for analytical and normative reasons. The very thesis that there is at least potentially
something like another kind of people that is not based on an exclusive and restrictive
identity is forcefully rejected. Andrew Arato has accused Laclau’s conception of popu-
lism for irresponsibly promoting a paradigm of political thought that is inseparable from
a totalitarian, even proto-fascist tendency (cf. Arato 2013, 156–58). From the perspective
of a procedural theory of democracy, any claim of embodying the people inevitably
sacrifices the plurality of civil society and thus suppresses the openness, contestedness
and the permanent tentativeness and temporality of the general will on which modern
democracy’s specific sense of political freedom rests (cf. Arato and Cohen 2017, 285–
89). In the following, I’m going to argue that while Laclau’s notion of populism as the
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embodiment of a people is certainly at odds with a purely procedural and institutionalist
theory of democracy and civil society, he is nevertheless analytically right when he
emphasises that any hegemony of a certain kind of procedural emptiness – also the
deliberative, civil society-based one – is historically preconditioned by a concretely
embodied emptiness of the universality of the people (section 1.1). All depends on how
to understand the mode of embodiment that Laclau sees to be necessarily implied by the
populist constitution of politics. I want to demonstrate that Laclau’s reconstruction of
constituting a people from below, from the negativity and minority of the plebs entails a
notion of ‘partial embodiment’ (Laclau 2005, 166) that is structurally opposed to the
repressive positivity of totalitarian embodiment that is typical for the right-populist
phantasy (but a really effective one) of a racially or culturally established populous
(section 1.2). By attaching systematically a negativist prefix to his constructivist account
on populism he is able to differentiate between a totalitarian ‘People’ that reify its
performative and subaltern becoming into a pseudo-objective identity of belonging from
another, radical-democratic ‘people’ that is self-transparently aware of its constructivist
and negativist formation. However, while latently critical, this distinction remains
descriptive and observer-related in Laclau’s account, thus still lacking the capacity to
rationally confront the immanent perspective of right-populist subjectivities. Hence the
tendency and limitation of a voluntarist and strategic attitude regarding radical politics
(section 1.3).
1.1. Populist construction of civil society
Before entering the discussion, we need to clarify the notion of populism in Laclau’s
account. For Laclau, populist movements tend to emerge whenever the institutionalised
body politics is confronted with social demands which it cannot absorb and resolve
through procedural means. In all those cases, the unsatisfied social demands assemble
at the margin of ‘the system’ where they undergo a process of radicalisation: reformist
requests are turned into revolutionary claims against the established modes and actors of
politics (cf. Laclau 2005, 73f). Besides their disaffection and frustration, the radicalised
demands have nothing in common except being radically opposed to a status quo that is
experienced as particularistic, restrictive, as lacking the capacity of truly integrating the
political community (cf. Laclau 2005, 19, 70, 96). These shared antagonistic experiences
give rise to the creation of a ‘chain of equivalence’ in which the different unfulfilled
demands are linked to each other (cf. Laclau 2005, 74, 77). Their linkage and common-
ality in turn is represented by an ‘empty signifier’ that points towards the embodiment of
fullness or universality that is still denied and obstructed by the institutionalised body
politics (cf. Laclau 2005, 71, 106). ‘The people’ is simply the name of this universality,
of a fullness that is at the same time empty enough in order to encompass a wide and
plural range of different demands. Fullness is only achieved through the construction of
emptiness (cf. Laclau 2005, 96f, 98f). However, this emptiness is nothing purely
abstract, not totally detached from historical concreteness, but empirically embodied
by and within the specific antagonistic relation between ‘the people’ and those mechan-
ism and forces it is polemically pitted against.
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Laclau equates the populist constitution of ‘the people’ with the logic of the political
as such (cf. Laclau 2015, 160–64).1 While ‘politics’ designates the institutionalised and
systemic working of sedimented social structures, ‘the political’ refers to all the inven-
tive or interruptive practices that institutionalise those structures in the very first place
(cf. Mouffe 2005, 8–34). The ‘political’ is construed as a field of construction where
different and opposing projects of instituting society fight with each other beyond any
possibility of a rational foundation respectively. ‘Aufhebung’ of the conflict in a Hege-
lian manner. Following this definition, it is not very plausible to identify ‘the political’
totally with the logic of populism, since the contestation of established politics through
alternative projects of hegemony isn’t confined to the underdogs and subalterns. Politics
is also contested from above, from elites that attempt (through the installation of techno-
cratic regimes etc) to surmount the permanent shocks and troubles initiated by popular
voices. However, in a more contextualised form, Laclau’s equation is quite convincing:
Within the horizon of what Claude Lefort calls (following Tocqueville) the ‘democratic
revolution’ (Tocqueville, quoted from Lefort 1988, 24, 183), ‘the people’ is generally
considered as the political subject that legitimately questions and challenges given
politics. In democracy, one could argue, ‘the political’ is normatively restricted to the
former’s subject, to ‘the people’ (cf. Marchart 2005, 13–15) – and truly expressed by
populist projects of embodying the latter.
Though, this is where dispute arises. Arato argues that in modern liberal democracy,
every embodiment of political community must remain absent in order to allow the
unconstrained flourishing of pluralist voices in civil society (cf. Arato 2013, 150–56).
Democracy is here imagined as a totally open and procedural structure without any kind
of substantial unity of the general will and strictly contrasted with ‘totalitarian’ notions
of embodiment of the latter (cf. Arato 2013, 155–57). This conceptual demarcation is
informed by Lefort’s theoretical reconstruction of the ‘democratic revolution’. Whereas
in feudalism the divine fullness of community was incarnated by the king’s body, such
ethico-political embodiment vanished with the advent of modernity. According to
Lefort’s famous phrase, in democracy, the ‘place of power’ remains principally ‘empty’
and is only temporally occupied through shifting party coalitions and electoral majorities
(cf. Lefort 1988, 17). From a radically procedural perspective, it is exactly this perma-
nent possibility of questioning and revising form and content of community that’s crucial
for democracy’s kratos, while re-embodying political community through ‘the people’
would again amount to an authoritarian repression of civil society’s open deliberation
between different voices, opinions and perspectives and thus to a totalitarian eradication
of democracy and its specific form of collective, but resolutely disembodied power (cf.
Arato and Cohen 2017, 284–89; Johnston 2017, 41).
Laclau is totally aware of the Lefortian emphasis on the emptiness of democracy’s
‘place of power’. He also generally shares Lefort’s commitment to a liberal, pluralist and
civil society-based constitution of democracy. However, he stresses that the procedural
emptiness in which the deliberative and electoral will-formation takes place needs to be
politically produced in the first place (cf. Laclau 2005, 164–71). The formalist frame of
civil society and its communicative channels and fora have to be created, and this
generation doesn’t happen in a purely juridical way, but through establishing historically
a concrete universality of citizenry, a discursive space of contestation and civil agonism
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in which equal citizens recognise each other and freely specify their common good (see
also Taylor 1989, 2016). In other words: a meta-subject is necessary for realising the
republican preconditions of democratic liberalism:
Emptiness, as far as that place [of power] is concerned, does not simply mean void; on the
contrary, there is emptiness because that void points to the absent fullness of the commu-
nity. Emptiness and fullness are, in fact, synonymous. But that fullness/emptiness can exist
only embodied in a hegemonic force. This means that emptiness circulates between the
place and its occupiers. They contaminate each other. So the logic of the King’s two bodies
has not disappeared in democratic society: it is simply not true that pure emptiness has
replaced the immortal body of the King. This immortal body is revived by the hegemonic
force. What has changed in democracy, as compared with the anciens regimes, is that in the
latter that revival took place in only one body, while today it transmigrates through a variety
of bodies. But the logic of embodiment continues to operate under democratic conditions
and, under certain circumstances, it can acquire considerable stability. (Laclau 2005, 170).
Crucially, ‘the people’ embodies the very community that constitutes the space of
civil society in the first place. In modernity, different projects of hegemony try to
concretely institutionalise the emptiness of the ‘place of power’. However, this doesn’t
mean that ‘true’ emptiness is placed above and abstracted from those attempts of con-
cretisation. Instead, both level ‘contaminate’ each other, as Laclau says: the universalism
respectively emptiness that is embodied by a people transcends the latter’s concreteness,
but this concreteness is nevertheless necessary for constructing that transcending uni-
versalism as a politically, life-worldly situated discourse. Otherwise universalism
remains pure, but also unable to structure and organise the political realm.
1.2. Constituting the people from below
For sure, to understand the constitution of a people as the concrete precondition of
Universalist politics seems to be counter-intuitive if we take into account all the fascist
and racist interpellations of ‘the people’ that are totally at odds with Universalist aspira-
tions. Isn’t any embodiment of political community through ‘the people’ tantamount to
an exclusivist, xenophobic and anti-liberal framework of participation? Isn’t the very
idea of embodiment as such privileging homogenous, ‘natural’ and sovereign unities at
the expense of heterogeneous, artificial, abnormal and fragmented elements? To talk
about embodiment seems to presuppose that there is an already constituted, ontologically
given whole that needs to be expressed by purifying it from all those alien moments that
pollute its pristine essence. This is, at least, how Arato understands ‘embodiment’ when
he constantly underlines its totalitarian character. For him, by embodying a purified
essence, the people must be also ‘extracted from within’, that is, aggressively separated
from those elements that doesn’t attest its true and original spirit (cf. Arato 2013, 147,
156–60). However, in his theory of populism, Laclau uses a conception of ‘partial
embodiment’ (Laclau 2005, 166) that precludes any totalitarian and essentialist tempta-
tion by starting from partiality instead of unity (a), negativity instead of positivity (b) and
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performativity instead of objectivity (c) when approaching the constitution of ‘the
people’2:
(a) In Laclau, the construction of populist subjects doesn’t rely on the assumption of
a given or lost unity of the people that could be affirmed or has to be restored (cf.
Laclau 2005, 97f, 104, 108, 118, 163f). On the contrary, the populist embodi-
ment is always directed against the traditionally existing community of the
populous. Hence, ‘partial embodiment’ means embodiment from the perspective
of partiality, from the particular view point of the plebs (cf. Laclau 2005, 115).
Of course, the plebs, as a part, attempts to represent the whole, that is, to
supplant the populous which is hitherto embodied by certain privileged groups
or strata (cf. Laclau 2005, 81f, 83, 86, 93f, 107). But this also means that the
populist process of embodying the whole is initially confronted with the expe-
rience of a prevailing and naturalised embodiment of unity that already exists
against it; it is situated in a subaltern perspective of challenging established
identities and therefore any presumption of being the natural incarnation of
political community is thwarted from the very beginning.
(b) In line with that subaltern partiality, the populist embodiment theorised by
Laclau is inherently negative in character. This means that there is no reference
to a positive substance that enables the proclamation of a homogenous people
(cf. Laclau 2005, 98, 118, 163f). Instead, all what is initially present in the
construction of the people is the ‘experience of a lack, a gap which has emerged
in the harmonious continuity of the social’ (Laclau 2005, 85), a shared sense of
‘deficient being or failed unicity’ (Laclau 2005, 223). These negative experi-
ences determine the body of the populist subject; nothing substantial, no shared
culture, ethnicity or race is able to unite those who are socially excluded from
those positive commonalities that actually only define the ‘respectable’ part of
the populous. This body is thus also made out of another kind of flesh: it is not
the healthy, strong, natural and organic flesh of pure being, but the unhealthy,
maltreat, degenerated and chaotic one of a dingy creature that is excluded from
the realm of recognised beings. Composed out of the negativity of ‘deficient
being’, it is not the ‘superior’ body of a pure-blooded ‘Volksgemeinschaft’, but
an ignoble body mixed out of deranged bitches and bastards.
(c) The populist unity of the people is therefore thoroughly a construction, a product
of performatively bringing about a community which doesn’t have any objec-
tivity that precedes the process of counter-hegemonic articulation (cf. Laclau
2005, 97, 99, 102f, 163f, 183). Laclau highlights this aspect with his nominalist
theory of naming: Instead of being a concept that represents a pregiven socio-
logical content, ‘the people’ is just a name that inaugurates its own referent
through the very act of naming (cf. Laclau 2005, 96–99, 102f, 118). Arato
criticises this nominalist construction of ‘the people’ for being a voluntarist and
even magic undertaking that heavily depends on the interpellating role of lead-
ership (cf. Arato 2013, 158f, 162f). But the act of naming is neither the exclusive
task of a single, superordinate, concretely personified and permanent leader (cf.
Arato 2013, 60f, 100) – even though some speaking agency is always necessary
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for uttering a name, but who speaks is up to changing constellations – nor is the
pure will of giving a name sufficient for performatively creating a people. Quite
the contrary, in order to name successfully a whole arrangement of discursive
conditions must be met that make the recipients to accept a certain name as their
own. This is probably the hardest work. However, it is important to emphasise
that we are dealing not with objective conditions here, but discursively con-
structed one, thus no original essence is actualised by the name of the people.
For sure, the partial, negativist and performative people from below is still constituted
antagonistically, that is, through excluding certain social, cultural and political elements
from its own, new-invented universalism of subaltern citizenship. The movement of the
sans-culottes in 1793, the Parisian communards from 1871 or the communist soviets
after World War I – all of them were directed against certain groups that were depicted as
the ‘enemy of the people’: feudal or bourgeois elites, monarchic, military or ecclesias-
tical authorities and so on. However, it would be misleading and a serious lack of
historical differentiation to easily criticise this attempts of antagonistic constitution for
being necessarily problematic from the ‘moral point of view’. Aristocrats or capitalists
weren’t excluded from subaltern peoplehood simply due to their attachment to different
values and world views or because they were of a different social, cultural or ethnical
origin. They weren’t excluded in their capacity of concrete persons, but only inasmuch as
they insisted on occupying a privileged position within society and political community.
What’s excluded by and from the people from below is the very idea of privilege,
exclusivity itself. This happens necessarily in order to establish an egalitarian univers-
alism of mass democracy in which also persons from a bourgeois or aristocratic back-
ground can in principle participate, but in which the privileged position and status that
has come along with this background is now longer accepted and recognised. In this
sense, every egalitarian conception of community inevitably rests on some kind of
moral–political exclusion.
1.3. Two peoples
On the one hand, Laclau’s theory of populism reveals the embodiment of ‘the people’ as
a performative construction from below that has to struggle against and smash positive
identities of belonging instead of being objectively grounded in the latter. ‘Being the
people’ means mere negativity, means being the plebeian, uncounted rest that hitherto
remains factually excluded from the universal community of recognised and honourable
political beings. The populist attempt of embodying a unity that is yet to come thus
derives from the experience of heterogeneity, subalternity and from an own lack of
valuable belonging. Populist embodiments of the people must therefore be conceptua-
lised as negativistic counter-communities that are initiated from the ‘part of those who
have no part’ (Rancière 1999, 11) and hence point according to the ‘reason’ (Laclau
2005) or ‘rationality’ (cf. Rancière 1999, 43–60) of their own political foundation
towards a further opening vis-à-vis heterogeneity, strangeness, subalternity. By recon-
structing the formation of populist subjects this way, Laclau is effectively subverting
totalitarian phantasm of embodiment that pretend to rely on a positive, quasi-theological
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and naturalised fullness of community that could be purified and exempted from the
open play of political differences, diversities and conflicts. In Laclau’s theory, populist
subjects are a contingent construction within the realm of ‘the political’, thus nothing
that could be referred back to any kind of ethnical or ethical essence.
On the other hand, Laclau’s theory of populism captures the whole range of populist
subjectivities, thus also including fascist or proto-fascist constructions of the people (cf.
Laclau 2005, 173–222). He offers first of all a descriptive approach that reconstructs the
coming about of political subjects from the perspective of the observer while it remains at
first sight unclear how do discriminate normatively between different versions of populist
construction. Since even right-populist movements can principally be described as sub-
altern constructions of identity, antagonistically directed against elites and their regimes, it
is ‘on Laclau’s ground [ . . . ] impossible to normatively distinguish’ them from those who
express Universalist aspirations, as Arato holds (cf. Arato 2013, 165f). He argues, that
according to Laclau’s conception of ‘floating signifier’ (Laclau 2005, 133, 134), the name
of ‘the people’ is constantly traveling between opposing political camps, from the right to
the left and back again, whereas the only way of politically influencing this movement is
‘rhetorical and emotional success’, because any notion of rationality beyond persuasion
would be missing in Laclau (cf. Arato 2013, 165f). While I will argue in a minute against
this objection by demonstrating that Laclau is implicitly employing a rational criterion of
normative distinction when he discusses different ‘varieties of populism’, it is nevertheless
important to stress that the deficit of rationality mentioned by Arato definitely occurs in
another prominent accounts, namely in Mouffe’s essay For a Left Populism.
Mouffe doesn’t systematically distinguish between left populism and prevailing
authoritarian alternatives. Her ‘radical investment’ (Laclau 2005, 71) into the contested
definition of the ‘floating signifier’: ‘the people’ operates mainly by shifting the line of
antagonism thematically: anti-capitalistic instead of anti-migrant issues should be
pushed to the fore; struggles for economic justice, gender equality, ecological protection
and an entirely vague deepening of the value and effect of citizenship must replace
xenophobic obsessions (cf. Mouffe 2019, 64–67, 79f, 84). For sure, in terms of political
content, Mouffe’s proposal might be perfectly right, but there is, besides referring to
contingent contents of counter-hegemonic ‘chains of equivalences’ (Mouffe 2019, 63),
no argument that helps us to understand why right and left populisms are systematically
opposed to each other and thus differ typologically, and why the latter has to be preferred
due to the rationality of its immanent construction and self-understanding. Instead of
investigating into possible reasons that could establish, defend and promote this con-
ceptual distinction, a strategic and voluntarist perspective on rhetorically creating new
affects of identification dominates Mouffe’s attention. Thus, she intervenes into a field
of floating affects in order to refract them in an emancipatory manner (cf. Mouffe 2019,
72–78). However, by doing so, her strategic, non-normative, resp. non-moralistic atti-
tude also blurs the central line of distinction between the ethico-political alternatives that
are really at stake here:
But a left populist strategy cannot ignore the strong libidinal investment at work in national –
or regional – forms of identification and it would be very risky to abandon this terrain to
right-wing populism. This does not mean following its example in promoting closed and
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defensive forms of nationalism, but instead offering another outlet for those affects, mobi-
lising them around a patriotic identification with the best and more egalitarian aspects of the
national tradition. (Mouffe 2019, 71)
However, by mobilising established affects of national belonging, Mouffe’s project is
already based on those ‘positive’ identities that consequently legitimate and motivate the
very authoritarian and xenophobic logic of privilege and exclusion which characterise
those right-populist projects it was originally pitted against. She is already on the wrong
track when she reproduces and reaffirms those affects: Regardless how strong the ega-
litarian implications of the nation are, they are deduced from the phantasm of ethnical (or
some other kind of already established, ‘rooted’, well-born and thus verified) community
and therefore principally reserved for its members. This is what the modern nation is
about: inferring membership and participation from some organic or in some other sense
positively given community that is reproduced by means of natural or cultural inheri-
tance, modelled along the lines of an expanded family tree (cf. Fichte 1807; Miller 1997,
1–27; Walzer 1983, 35–42). We are already on the terrain of right populism, because the
‘nation’ exactly signifies a notion of political subjectivity that mystifies the subaltern/
partial, negativist and performative–constructive character of its own becoming. Recog-
nising this character instead and constantly avoiding its mystification is the very aspect
that could really discriminate a left-wing, self-transparent and emancipatory ‘people’
from a right-wing, ideological and regressive ‘People’ that represses pluralism and
heterogeneity in the name of a totalitarian and predefined essence.
Latently, this distinction is already present in Laclau’s theory of populism. He there-
fore overcomes the shortcoming of a superficial and content-based definition of left
populism and the limits of a purely rhetorical strategy of intervention that completely
bypasses the level of rationality. For him, a proper populist subject is contrasted to an
improper one according to how it conceives itself. When discussing ‘authoritarian popu-
lism’ he writes:
What happens, however, if the ‘people’ is conceived as an a priori homogeneous entity
postulated from a centre of power which, instead of being the social precipitate of an
equivalential interaction of democratic demands, is seen as determining an identical sub-
stance that any demand expresses? [ . . . ]The ‘people’ can still be conceived as a radical
force opposed to the existing status quo, but it is no longer an underdog: the essential
heterogeneity which is the basis of any populist identity has been surrendered and replaced
by a homogeneous unity. That is what happened in Turkey, and it explains why Kemalism
might have been a radical, ruptural discourse, but it was never populist. (Laclau 2005, 208)
In Laclau, the conception of populism in a full sense seemingly applies only to those
political subjectivities that self-transparently recognise their subaltern, heterogeneous
and performative construction. For him, the very fact that Kemalism ‘replaces’ the
heterogeneity of ‘the people’ with the semblance of national homogeneity amounts to
being not really populist at all.3 The difference that’s crucial here is not heterogeneity
versus homogeneity, subalternity versus positive substance. All populist subjectivities
are heterogeneous and initially motivated by an outsider-perspective. In some sense, the
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‘people’ is always opposed to a regime of power that remains exclusive vis-à-vis certain
demands. What matters here is being collectively aware of this negativity and to take into
view the complex construction that has preceded popular unity. In short, for Laclau, the
self-reflexive knowledge of how ‘the people’ emerges historically is an eminent aspect
of being truly a populist subject. By introducing implicitly the second-order criterion of
self-reflexivity and self-transparency into the definition of populism, it gets possible to
evaluate and criticise empirical manifestations of populism not according to external
arguments and contingent notions of what’s a good political content, but according to an
immanent yardstick: Has the populist subject in question an adequate understanding of
its own historical becoming and social composition, or is the latter misconceived or
concealed by mystifying notions of community, unity and belonging? Asking this ques-
tion has directly a normative dimension, since misconceiving its own performative
coming about leads to a reified notion of identity that negates and betrays its own and
actual reason of being. Thus, we can distinguish a pathological ‘People’ that undermines
the emancipatory discourse of including inferior masses into the realm of power and that
therefore also negates the very historical foundation of popular sovereignty, from a self-
reflexive and non-reified ‘people’ that recognises, affirms, reinforces and therefore tends
to deepen the logic of subaltern universalism.
2. Self-negating people?
The notion of self-negation allows moving from a decisionist and rhetorical intervention
to a mode of immanent critique when it comes about dealing with the challenge of right-
wing populism. It is now focused the rationality of political subjectivation, the way how
‘the people’ relates epistemically to its practical formation. Though, when white under
classes claim to be the original, rooted and well-born people, they not only obscure
ideologically the process of subaltern subjectivation that turned them into the people in
the very first place. At the same time, also the normative reasons are rejected and
radically reversed that were at play when popular sovereignty was revolutionary
enforced vis-à-vis elitist government: the logic of inclusion of ‘those who have no part’
(Rancière 1999, 11), who a merely human beings, who are an unqualified element of ‘the
people’, is supplanted by a nationalist paradigm of privilege according to which the
modern inclusion of the masses of ignoble ancestry would have actually to be revoked.
When members of the white working class whose social ancestors were originally not
considered to be part of the recognised populous, but casted as dangerous outcasts and
offsprings of an inferior race (cf. Balibar 1991, 207–209), argue for a nationalist closure
of the people and thereby re-actualise the exclusivist logic of privilege, they employ a
restrictive paradigm of participation that tentatively negates their own membership in
political community. Every emancipatory claim of modern mass democracy that could
prevent the latter from being re-reduced to elitist government is implicitly extinguished
whenever the privilege of national belonging and the tradition of natural heritage is
declared to be the ‘ethical’ foundation of the people. By making participation generally
dependent on historically interchangeable social criteria for good, responsible and reli-
able citizenship (wealth, education, ethnical belonging), there is ultimately no normative
argument at hand that could repel their own exclusion. This notion of a (neo-)racist
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self-negation of the people is clearly articulated and radicalised by Christoph Menke. In
his short essay Zurück zu Hannah Arendt, he criticises a purely humanitarian and jur-
idical conception of human rights that is just externally confronted with the principle of
collective autonomy. He argues that as long as the human rights of refugees aren’t
interpreted as a right to participate politically, they remain ultimately powerless (cf.
Menke 2016, 54–58). However, by rejecting this political dimension of human rights,
by excluding the refugee from the demos, the latter also negates itself. According to
Menke, the exclusive people violates the very principles of belonging and participation
that constitute community as a real, true, proper community:
The No that the community shouts to the refugee – you aren’t a participant, because you are
not a part of us – is actually a No that the community expresses vis-a-vis itself. [ . . . ] By
denying to the refugee participation, the community denies the latter to its own members.
The real injustice is not that we deny to the refugee something that we have. [ . . . ] Rather,
the injustice toward the refugee is only the flipside of, or identical with [ . . . ] the injustice
toward ourself. [ . . . ] Community’s justice vis-a-vis the refugee is not a justice vis-a-vis the
alien, but vis-a-vis itself. Real justice would require that we establish a social relation in
which we are truly participants [ . . . ]. (Menke 2016, 57; my own translation)4
Of course, Menke postulates a normative essence of community as such that is hard to
defend. He speaks about a truth of community to which the latter must live up in order to
realise its inner condition. However, this truth is essential mainly for modern and dem-
ocratic communities that are constituted by Universalist norms. It is their historically
specific rationale of participation and belonging which is violated by exclusive defini-
tions of the people, and this violation in turn leads to a revocation of the whole founda-
tion of community and membership. Within this historical context, we seem to have, if
we follow Menke, all what we need for immanent critique. Firstly, there is the notion of a
social subject that is self-reflectively related to its own essence or truth; Menke explicitly
takes the first-person resp. participant perspective when he addresses the self-relation of
the subject while Laclau merely describes what’s going on when populist subjects con-
ceive or misconceive themselves without discussing what conceiving or misconceiving
themselves means from the actor’s perspective, especially in normative terms. Secondly,
Menke presupposes that there is really something like a universal truth, logic or rationale
of political subjectivation that is beyond contestation and could thus serve as a baseline
for criticising all those notions and discourses that miss or disclaim this truth.
Thus, Menke presumably still employs the classical Hegelian philosophy of history
and the opportunity of immanent critique that is implied by it. According to this view,
social and political community is a historical manifestation of reason. The subject of this
manifestation is considered as a conscious entity which realises itself as a unified and
autonomous community during the process of manifestation. Ultimately, the subject of
this historical progress is universal humanity, but the latter is not always already there,
but the performative result of struggles and conflicts that have their starting point in
experiences of negativity, heteronomy, of a lack of unity and autonomy that teleologi-
cally point towards their own overcoming and thus intrinsically aspire universality.
Against this backdrop, closing political community in the name of a positive substance
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of belonging that restricts legitimate membership amounts to a betrayal of the negati-
vistic truth of the formation of political community according to which the latter’s
universalism is defined from a subaltern perspective. Thus, also the actual normative
foundation of community is ultimately revoked and eradicated.
In Laclau, there is also the truth of subalternity, negativity and performativity that
constitutes populist subjectivities. Against this backdrop, populist self-conceptions can
be epistemically and normatively evaluated. From a radical-democratic point of view, it
is indeed possible to critically assess whether they take into account their contingent and
negativist nature and are due to this awareness cultivating a pluralist and inclusive ethos
of political belonging, or whether they misconceive the fact of not relying on a positive
substance and foundation, of being in the first place merely the result of subaltern
construction and therefore (due to this self-misunderstanding) promote some kind of
in-group fundamentalism, based on seemingly natural, well-anchored identities
(cf. Critchley 2004; Glynos 2001). However, in Laclau, the truth of construction is
relativised by the constructed: In his post-foundationalist account, there is actually
nothing like an essence of political subjectivity that is independent from its discursive
representation (cf. Laclau 2005, 98f, 109f). Populist subjects are constituted in the name
of the people, but the latter doesn’t signify any objective content or teleological deter-
mination of an already existing or at least somehow prefigured subject that historically
unfolds and realises itself (cf. Laclau 2005, 126f, 146). At least, Laclau doesn’t think that
political subjects are easily able to pierce through the surface of discursive articulation in
order to rediscover their pre-discursive truth, a rational sense of universality according to
which the populist rhetoric of the concrete universality of ‘the people’ could be judged.
For him, there is no ethnical subject rooted in nature that could serve as the ontological
foundation for populist politics. But there is – at least at first sight – also no ethical
subject rooted in reason that could serve as a philosophical baseline for the historical
Bildungsgeschichte of ‘the people’. Such an assumption of a rational and singular
subject that realises itself in history through overcoming its original negativity (or sub-
alternity) is paradigmatically totally at odds with Laclau’s radical Post-Hegelianism
(cf. Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 114–27, 134–48; Mouffe 2013, xif). In his framework,
the semblance itself constitutes the subjectivity and reality of the actors, and when a
nationalist discourse was successful in establishing an essentialist notion of the people, it
is very difficult to demonstrate why the latter is mystifying and normatively self-
defeating. What’s a self-misunderstanding and self-negation from the perspective of
scientific observation that is aware of the fact of the subaltern coming about of the
populist subject can on the other hand function as a very solid and effective evidence
in terms of sedimented nationalist practices of political subjectivation. As a conse-
quence, the radical-democratic critique of fundamentalist and identitarian notions of the
people remains external vis-a-vis the latter. It is unable to shatter their assumed founda-
tion because according to Laclau, the discursive reproduction of political subjectivities
doesn’t practically depend on realising and recognising its post-foundational truth
(cf. Laclau 1996, 77).
Ideology becomes true. This radical-democratic insight is missing in Menke’s oppo-
sition between the normative truth of community and its distortion or perversion. The-
oretically situated in a left-Hegelian tradition, he seems to assume that some version of
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practical rationality serves as a solid groundwork for a dialectical unfolding of history.
The universalism of community might have been betrayed, ignored, violated; commu-
nity is dirempted from its constituting concept, but it is possible and in the long run also
necessary to return to this concept, to reconcile with its telos, to get rid of ideological
mystification through critical reflection. In contrast to that, Laclau’s deconstruction of
objectivity has shattered all notions of a rational foundation that encompasses society as
a totality. Hegelian totality is cracked into a plurality of different attempts to institute an
ethico-political foundation for social life (cf. Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 122–27, 134–48;
Laclau 2000). Insofar, community’s refusal of universalism doesn’t amount to a com-
plete eradication of its own foundation, because there has been already another norma-
tive basis discursively created on which community can be build: the ‘nation’ that is
perceived not as an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983), but as a natural complex of
belonging that distributes social shares among its members according to cultural or
ethnical criteria. The self-negating people is reaffirmed and reconstituted within another
framework that seems to be fully sated with unquestionable positivity. The immanent
crisis of community, to which Menke refers, is ‘luckily’ avoided through openly embra-
cing particularistic identities as the ‘normal’ way to constitute and organise ‘the people’.
3. Reconstructing the nationalist self-negation
of the plebeian people
However, even though the realm of the political is ultimately beyond a unifying founda-
tion and thus two (or more) completely diametral constructions of the people are abso-
lutely opposed to each other, one doesn’t necessarily return to a situation where only
decisionism or moral reasons are at hand in order to react to the challenge of right-wing
populism. Rather, it is possible to critical address the latter’s immanent tendency by
reconstructing the historical transmutation that brought about the reified right-wing
‘People’. Thus, instead of merely politically confronting the nationalist ‘People’ with
a reflexive, left-wing people in a voluntaristic manner, we can critically reconstruct the
historical development that has brought about the former as a history of self-negation of
certain radical-democratic qualities and intentions that constituted the populist meaning
of the people in the very first place. According to my general thesis, we are able to
overcome the unresolvable opposition of two political world views and populist self-
understandings in the here and now by revisiting and problematising the process of
becoming that has led to the emergence of the reified ‘People’. This ‘People’ is not
simply an alternative possibility of populist subjectivation but self-contradictorily inas-
much – and this is the central assumption – as historically, the people’s formation as a
political subject always (even in nationalist cases) starts from some underdog-position
and therefore has a subaltern and negativist raison d’être in relation to which the nation-
alist tendency appears as ideological betrayal with regressive normative consequences.
But this self-negation gets only visible when we take a diachronic perspective, when
we trace and track the process of populist subjectivation: The very ethico-political
ambivalence of the meaning of ‘the people’ seems to indicate that there is a specific
dynamic or passage that has lead time and again to a transmutation of one people into the
other one, of the subaltern, negativist and performative ‘people’ into an already unified,
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established and recognised, positivist and essentialist ‘People’. The first task of critically
confronting the reified, ‘rooted People’ is to understand this transmutation. Can this shift
be described as a structural history of a failure of a subaltern, sans-scullottian counter-
hegemony of the plebeian people? Can this shift be interpreted as a reactionary revoca-
tion or resolution of the emancipatory demands of this people? Is the conformist
integration of the plebs into the traditional populous and its particularist paradigm of
privilege to be considered as a conservative substitution of a radical-democratic project
of participation and of a subaltern foundation of community that has failed due to its
inability to fully democratise social power, to overcome the capitalist frame of democ-
racy? And does the self-negation of the people persist even if its members are formally
integrated into a national and privileged sphere of citizenship? Is the conformist integra-
tion of the plebs into the populous tantamount to a hierarchised form of participation that
reproduces exclusion and subalternity within and through the commonality of
citizenship?
To reflect upon the shift from one people into another one along such questions
already transcends the limitations of a norm-free descriptions of changing discursive
settings and strategies of hegemonic articulation. In order to critically address this shift
and to affect it immanently, a different, more demanding inquiry is necessary that grasps
the history of modern democracy philosophically as a regressive development of popular
sovereignty. Schematically speaking, such a theoretical reconstruction of the develop-
ment of modern democracy, that is informed by a negativist refraction of Hegelian
philosophy of history, proceeds as follows:
(a) It starts from the assumption that the ‘democratic revolution’ (Tocqueville, quoted
from Lefort 1988, 24, 183) at the dawn of modernity was motivated by a radical-
democratic project of collective autonomy according to which any spheres,
aspects and dimensions of social life should be subjected to democratic contesta-
tion and modelling (cf. Marchart 2015), to a restless democratisation that leaves
no pre-political precondition of political community (authority, wealth, origin)
untouched; to erase any pre-political, natural precondition means to define par-
ticipation and community entirely from the perspective of those who posses no
special qualification for participation, who are only part of an undifferentiated
mass, humanity, concretised as ‘the people’ (cf. Rancière 1999, 8f).
(b) After locating the radical-democratic starting point of the modern aspiration of
collective autonomy, it is possible to show how this project came into crisis,
because it was blocked by seemingly natural powers that persisted democratisa-
tion and reintroduced elitist components into the self-understanding of modern
democracy while in line with this exempting large sphere of social life from the
claim of collective autonomy; Proletarian and plebeian classes remained effec-
tively and often also explicitly excluded from equal participation in political
community, because the exemption of ‘bourgeois society’ from democracy
amounted to a bourgeois restriction and distortion of popular sovereignty.
(c) However, this is not where the story ends. It is important to understand how this
crisis and frustration of radical democracy was concretely sublated. There was a
certain resolution of this crisis that was organised around the notion of the
298 Philosophy and Social Criticism 47(3)
nation. The nation was invented and imagined as a new home, a new, extended
family in which hitherto excluded, subaltern groups could ‘naturally’ or ‘fate-
fully’ take part (cf. Anderson 1983, 141–44). As a subversive political subject,
working class was juridically excluded from politics and object of rigid repres-
sion. But this subalternity had been overcome with the rise of nationalism and
the shared, war-like experience of ‘Schicksals- und Blutsgemeinschaft’ in which
true citizenship found its solid foundation.
(d) At this point, it is important to grasp the deeply ambivalent character of this
process of nationalist inclusion. What is on one hand the resolution of the crisis
and historical inability of radical democracy (and hence indicates progress) is at
the very same time the self-negation of its original longing for equal participa-
tion. The functional equivalent for radical democracy – the national democracy
of a ‘rooted’ people – not only betrays its subaltern history, but also sacrifices
the unrestricted insistence on ‘participatory parity’ (Fraser 2003, 31) that leaves
no authorities, no superiority of status and no semblance of the givenness of the
social world, that comes along with it, unchallenged. This regression seems to
have conceptual reasons. The very paradigm of the family that is implied by the
notion of the nation (cf. Walzer 1983, 35–42) already entails a premise of
natural inequality: A family connects its members to each other in an unequal
and paternalistic way; they relate to each other as caring fathers, devoted moth-
ers, immature, but nevertheless appended children; Understood in terms of
organic belonging, family is a community of unequals in which the common
‘We’ is structured at least implicitly in a hierarchical manner (cf. Hegel 1991
[1821], §§ 174f), thus always leaving open the possibility of exclusion or sub-
jugation (of the ‘black sheep’, ignoble, immature under classes) within the realm
of inclusion. This structure of unequal commonality must still reconstructed
theoretically. Empirically, it is indicated time and again, when political repre-
sentatives speak about ‘ordinary people’ that need to be satisfied and pacified by
paternalistically suppling them with sufficient jobs, security, and a sense of
being heard, of being considered by elites, instead of really taking part in the
endeavour of collective autonomy themselves.
Again, it is necessary to stress that the theoretical reconstruction of modern democ-
racy’s regression I have just roughly sketched surely is in tension with Laclau’s post-
foundational framework. Laclau’s observation of a self-negation that is implied by a
reified notion of ‘the people’ is strongly radicalised here. According to this perspective,
the non-transparency and reification in regard to the constitution of ‘the people’ is
tantamount to an invalidation and revocation of the very attempt of political subjectivity.
However, this is not true for political subjectivity as such. The radical constructivism of
Laclau’s post-foundationalism has a kernel of truth inasmuch as the discursive self-
misinterpretation can practically become the very historical basis and content of the self
itself. Accordingly, it is not very helpful to locate objective interests and to hold that they
are in danger due to the self-negation of the people just described (cf. Adorno 2019, 28f,
51f): For sure, the interest in egalitarian participation has been betrayed by the nationalist
transmutation of ‘the people’, but is has also been more or less successfully supplanted
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by a new interest in homogeneity, security, authoritarian synthesis and parochial soli-
darity. The emancipatory rigour of radical democracy seems to be quite outdated today,
at least if we talk about the self-understanding of right-populist actors.
Nevertheless, the Hegelian radicalisation of Laclau’s self-negation-thesis seems to be
much more convincing if we explicitly approach the matter from the perspective of the
project of radical democracy that is guided by specific emancipatory demands. If we
look from this angel and if we particularly concentrate on the process of transmutation of
the meaning of the people, the self-negation becomes manifest in actu. That is, if we
historically concretise form and content of democracy’s subject and if we historically
situate our analytical view within the process of transmutation, we can more plausibly
trace the latter’s self-negation. This amounts to a kind of situated and concretised
philosophy of history in which the Hegelian notion of a subject that autonomously
unfolds itself can be identified with radical democracy as a project of political subjecti-
vation. At first sight, that seems to be a forced or arbitrary marriage of incompatible
theoretical perspectives. However, the Hegelian and the radical-democratic subject have
central commonalities that still have remained mostly unnoticed: From both perspec-
tives, the subject and its truth is not always already there, but performs its origin through
and in struggle; the self-transparency of the subject reveals nothing positive or substan-
tial, but only the contestative nature of negativity and its longing for a universality yet to
come; but besides not being grounded in a positive essence, there is nevertheless some-
thing like an essence, namely the political process of formation of subjectivity itself and
the Universalist desires that propel this process (see from another angel Hetzel 2009). It
is thus possible to overcome the limitations of Laclau’s radical-democratic critique of
right-wing populism through a Hegelian reconstruction of the process of political sub-
jectivation without relapsing into essentialist assumptions that are at odds with post-
foundational approaches.
4. Conclusion
To sum up: it is possible to discriminate conceptually an emancipatory notion of the
people from a reactionary, racist and reified one. Against wide-spread criticism of left-
wing populism that depict the latter as only repeating the totalitarian logic of right-wing
populism while superficially re-painting its surface, I have argued with reference to
Laclau that there is potentially another people that is self-transparently aware of its
partial, subaltern and performative way of construction and thus resists any temptation
of totalitarian closure, racist restriction and reification. Insofar as actually any populist
subject is politically constructed originally this way, it gets possible to criticise right-
wing populism for negating this truth of construction that is instead authentically and
transparently embodied by its radical-democratic counterpart. This is an important step
forward, not only theoretically, but also in political terms. One can overcome moralistic
and politicistic counter-strategies that either confront right-wing populism with norms
that risk to remain external to its self-understanding and history or are deprived of any
normative content at all and thus construe the confrontation between right- and left-
populism as a situation of arbitrary decision. Instead, another counter-strategy gets
available, namely an approach of immanent critique that addresses the self-
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understanding of right-populist subjects by demonstrating that they are not aware of the
subaltern origin and becoming of ‘the people’, that they negate their original outsider-
perspective vis-à-vis the established identity of the populous and that they thus revoke
the very normativity of subaltern universalism that constituted the people according to its
modern, revolutionary understanding in the very first place. However, the strategy of
immanent critique has to deal with the problem that the subaltern origin of ‘people’ was
often successfully supplanted and overwritten by nationalist discourses that seemingly
offer a new foundation for the collective autonomy of ‘the people’. Nevertheless, imma-
nent critique remains a promising option inasmuch as one can reconstruct the historical
process of the transmutation of one people into the other, reified one as tendency of
regression, of a failure and a wrong and disadvantageous substitution of the ambitions of
radical democracy, originally projected from the perspective of subalternity. The nation-
alist reification of the people that today seems to be a solid, ‘natural’ reality beyond
doubt can maybe politically bursted again if we return theoretically to the passages in
history when this reification originally took place as an ideological reaction to a crisis of
radical democracy and its promising pretensions. For sure, how to translate this theore-
tical critique into a political intervention remains beyond the limits of this article.
However, at least one can identify the challenge: The political prospects of the critical
project depend on the capacity to illuminate and discursively reframe the experiences
and perceptions of right-populist subjects in a way that makes visible the subaltern truth
of their own origin and the regressive self-negation of this very truth that they themselves
are committing. The practical exercise of the critique thus doesn’t proceed by re-
refracting the populist passion (just) through an alternative politics of affects, but by





1. On the pages just quoted Laclau identifies populism with ‘politics’. However, this is concep-
tually quite confusing within the tradition of radical democracy. Inasmuch as populism inter-
rupts and radically challenges politics (defined as an already institutionalised structure), it
manifests ‘the political’.
2. Laclau introduces the notion of ‘partial embodiment’ as follows: ‘Between total embodiment
and total emptiness there is a graduation of situations involving partial embodiment. These
partial embodiments are precisely the forms taken by hegemonic practices’ (Laclau 2005, 166).
Here, in connection with ‘graduation’, ‘partial embodiment’ seems to mean embodiment ‘to a
greater or lesser extend’. However, it is hard to make sense of such a gradualistic qualification
when it comes about constituting the unity (and not a fraction) of ‘the people’. In what follows, I
will interpret ‘partial’ as ‘partisan’, because this seems much more in line with Laclau’s own
theory of populist construction of ‘the people’ that has a negativistic, subaltern and in that sense
‘partisan’ or ‘partial’ starting point, but nevertheless constitutively aspire to fully embody unity,
not only ‘more or less’.
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3. The same applies, according to Laclau, to cases of ‘ethno-populism’ where the internal frontier
in a given society that originally had sparked the counter-hegemonic work of populist articula-
tion was lost out of sight and replaced by the notion of an external frontier between a reconciled
community and foreign groups. Here again, the awareness of the actual subaltern and perfor-
mative becoming of the people is ideologically repressed and supplanted by the phantasm of a
homogenous community that has been always already there and thus primarily need to fight
against external and foreign elements (cf. Laclau 2005, 196f).
4. German original: ‘Das Nein, das das Gemeinwesen dem Flüchtling entgegenruft – Du bist gar
kein Anteil, den Du bist kein Teil von uns – ist daher in Wahrheit ein Nein des Gemeinwesens
zu sich selbst. [ . . . ] Indem ein Gemeinwesen bestreitet, dass der Flüchtling ein Anteil ist,
bestreitet es dies seinen eigenen Mitgliedern. Die Ungerechtigkeit gegenüber dem Flüchtling
liegt nicht darin, dass wir ihm etwas abschlagen, was wir selbst haben [ . . . ]. [Vielmehr ist] die
Ungerechtigkeit gegenüber dem Flüchtling nur die andere Seite, ja dasselbe [ . . . ] wie die
Ungerechtigkeit uns selbst gegenüber. [ . . . ] Die Gerechtigkeit des Gemeinwesens gegenüber
dem Flüchtling ist nicht die Gerechtigkeit gegenüber dem Anderen, sondern gegenüber sich
selbst. Sie verlangt von uns, einen sozialen Zusammenhang zu schaffen, in dem es wahr ist,
dass wir soziale Anteile sind [ . . . ]’.
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